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Revenge of the Radical Right 
 
 
Abstract 
 
What explains the success and failure of radical right parties over time and across 
countries? This paper presents a new theory of the radical right that emphasizes its 
reactive nature and views it as backlash against the political successes of minorities and 
concessions extracted on their behalf. Unlike approaches that focus on competition 
between the extreme and mainstream parties, the theory stresses the dynamics between 
radical right and non-proximate parties that promote minority rights. Most notably, it 
derives the salience of identity issues in party politics from the polarization of the party 
system. The theory is tested with a new party-election-level data set covering all post-
communist democracies over the past twenty years. The results provide strong support 
for the theory, and show that the rise and fall of radical right parties is shaped by the 
politics of minority accommodation. 
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What explains variation in the electoral success and failure of radical right parties? This 
article provides a new theory of why radical right parties succeed in some countries and 
fail in others, and why the electoral fortunes of radical right parties fluctuate within 
countries over time. Contrary to other approaches that focus on institutions, economic 
grievances, mainstream party behavior, legacies and corruption, my theory suggests that 
radical right parties respond to the political successes of minorities, and seek to reverse 
their political gains. The proposed model endogenizes issue salience in party competition 
to the spatial positions of parties on non-economic issues. It shows that the 
accommodation of politically organized minorities polarizes party systems, and explains 
variation in the electoral success of radical right parties.
1
  
The radical right party family is the fastest growing party family in Europe 
(Mudde, 2007). In Western Europe, radical right parties emerged in the late 1980s and 
have grown in importance ever since (Arzheimer, 2009; Art, 2011; Kitschelt, 2007; 
Ivarsflaten, 2008). In Eastern Europe, most radical right parties emerged in the wake of 
1989, and their electoral fortunes have varied greatly across countries and time 
(Greskovits, 2007; Kopecky & Mudde, 2003; Minkenberg, 2009; Mudde, 2005; Pop 
Eleches, 2010; Ramet, 1999; Tucker, 2005; Vachudova, 2008).
2 
For example, in Croatia, 
Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Serbia and Slovakia, radical right parties have been present in 
governing coalitions since the founding elections and have significantly shaped minority 
policies. But radical right parties have either been altogether absent or largely 
unsuccessful in Albania, Czech Republic, Moldova, Montenegro and Ukraine.  
Throughout the 1990s, the study of radical right parties in Eastern Europe was 
largely neglected, as most scholars focused on the success and failure of newly emerging 
(mainstream) political parties, with some attention also paid to political extremism on the 
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left (Ishiyama, 1997; Grzymala-Busse, 2002). After a decade of transition-oriented 
literature, the focus slowly shifted to the study of extremism on the right, and the 
literature on radical right parties in Eastern Europe has slowly begun to flourish (Ekiert, 
2006; Lewis, 2009; Ost, 2005; Held, 1996; Hockenos, 1993; Minkenberg, 2002; 
O’Dwyer & Schwartz, 2010; Shafir, 2002). Building on these excellent studies, this 
article fills a gap by developing a novel theoretical explanation for variation in the 
electoral success of radical right parties across countries and over time, and by providing 
a systematic time-series analysis of the theory’s implications in all post-communist 
democracies.  
The proposed model differs from both supply and demand side theories (Eatwell, 
2003; Norris, 2005; Van der Brug et al., 2005). Demand side theories have focused on 
psychological sentiments, institutional arrangements, historical processes and economic 
grievances. Although adverse economic conditions can certainly create grievances that 
may later facilitate the rise of radical parties and contribute to their survival, grievances 
are too static to explain cross-national volatility over time (Betz, 1994; Golder, 2003; 
Kitschelt & McGann, 1995; Swank & Betz, 2003; c.f. Arzeheimer, 2009:274; Givens 
2004). 
Supply side theories and institutional theories predict radical party support to vary 
in tandem with mainstream party strategies, competition between proximate parties, 
perceptions of future coalition bargaining, internal party organizations, opportunity 
structures and party system institutions (Adams et al., 2006; Carter, 2005; Kedar, 2005; 
Meguid, 2005). Party-oriented, supply-side accounts mostly treat salience as exogenous 
to the party system and have tended to overlook the role of parties at the other ideological 
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extreme. My theory views these parties, which Sartori (1976) called “bilateral opposites”, 
as vital to explaining variation in radical right support.  
Whereas earlier supply-side research has generally treated the radical right's 
electoral prospects as a function of either mainstream or proximate party strategies, I 
argue that temporal variation in the success of radical right parties is driven by the 
success of ethnic and socially liberal parties on the left. The presence and actions of the 
bilateral opposite polarizes the party system and increases issue salience. Contrary to 
economic issues where parties can project positions that are salient, yet also centrist, non-
economic issues become salient when parties polarize; that is, when politically organized 
minorities ascend to power and governments pursue pro-minority policies.  
Radical right parties arise as a backlash against concessions extracted by 
politically organized ethnic and social minorities. When politically mobilized minorities 
extract concessions and accommodation increases, the theory predicts that radical right 
parties will gain in strength. Conversely, when the status quo is preserved or 
accommodation recedes, radical right parties are predicted to lose strength. The article 
tests these predictions using original party-level electoral data covering all post-
communist democracies from 1990-2012. The results strongly support these hypotheses, 
and indicate that the rise and decline of radical right parties is shaped by the electoral 
fortunes of bilateral opposite parties and the accommodation of minority groups. 
In the next section, I define radical right parties, bilateral opposites and develop 
the theoretical argument. After introducing a new dataset and the methods, I discuss the 
statistical results and corroborative case study evidence. The last section concludes with a 
discussion of the theory’s external validity and its contribution to understanding the roots 
of political extremism.  
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Defining Radical Right Parties 
Since identity policies exist on what is traditionally understood to be the right and the 
left, a useful party typology should place parties using their positions on identity issues.
3
 
My classification system for the parties is built on the grid-group theoretical framework, 
first developed by Douglas (Thompson et al., 1990). Two ideological dimensions define 
this typology - radical nationalism and radical socio-cultural conservatism – and these 
dimensions correspond to two modes of social control: grid and group. The grid-group 
typology generates four ideal types of parties in a grid-group space.
 
  
A radical right party is defined as a party that scores high on social 
authoritarianism and nationalism (high grid and high group). These parties are either 
highly nationalistic and/or extremely socially conservative. If a party scores high on only 
one dimension and low on the other dimension, it is not classified as a radical right party. 
This applies for example to some of the communist parties who support social minorities 
and gender equality (low on grid) yet are nationalistic (high on group).
 4
  
The “bilateral opposite” of a radical right party is an ethno-liberal party, or a party 
that scores low on grid and group. Such parties often advocate ethnic quotas, minority 
autonomy in schooling, elevation of the minority language to the status of the official 
language, targeted access to state resources and preferential economic policies.
5
 Parties 
were classified using primarily three resources: expert surveys, party ideology and case 
studies.
6
 
- TABLE 1 HERE - 
Radical right parties in Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and 
Slovenia have been steadily attracting some voter support since the early 1990s, although 
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their electoral fortunes have fluctuated considerably across elections from five to forty 
percent of the popular vote. Elsewhere, such as Albania, Macedonia and the Czech 
Republic, radical parties emerged rapidly, only to disappear just as quickly, while in 
Moldova, Montenegro such parties never or hardly appeared at all. Table 1 shows how 
the strength of radical parties has varied considerably over time and across countries. The 
theory outlined in the next section offers an explanation for why.  
 
A Theory of the Radical Right 
The claim that radical right parties are not fond of minorities is not new, but we should 
not be blinded by the inflammatory nature of the rhetoric. I argue that voting for radical 
right parties does not originate in hatred against minorities, but rather in opposition to 
policies that accommodate their demands and the political advancement of minorities. 
The theory suggests that radical right parties respond to the electoral success of pro-
minority parties, and therefore variation in minority political accommodation should 
predict change in electoral support for radical right parties. 
The case of Macedonia illustrates this logic. In 2001, a brief but violent armed 
conflict erupted between the ethnic Albanian militants and the Macedonian government, 
and was settled by the Ohrid Agreement, which improved the status of Albanians within 
Macedonia. The agreement elevated the Albanian language to an official status and 
established an Albanian speaking university in Tetovo. In the 2002 elections, the 
dominant party (VMRO-DPMNE) lost, and was replaced by a coalition called “Together 
for Macedonia Alliance”, which ruled together with the largest Albanian ethnic political 
party (BDI), and created pro-Albanian legislation. In the 2006 election, an extremist, 
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nationalist wing split from VMRO-DPMNE and targeted “minorities with privileges” (a 
euphemism for Albanians) and entered the parliament with six percent of the votes.  
Moderate parties may court politically organized groups that support the 
accommodation of minorities and advocate socially liberal policies to form governing 
coalitions. Change in accommodation and group status often result when minority 
representatives are elected or appointed into public offices and advance minority causes, 
typically in education and regional development. When this dynamic ensues, radical right 
parties benefit from the backlash against political concessions to minorities. Policy 
concessions result in programmatic divergence, and therefore salience can be derived 
from spatial polarization. When pro-minority advocates obtain government portfolios or 
seats in the parliament, they can extract state resources or policy concessions, which 
breeds resentment and mobilizes radical right voters and parties. 
In this model, the electoral success of radical right parties is thus integrally tied to 
coalition politics. Although there is a large literature on the dynamics of coalition 
formation (Grzymala-Busse, 2001; Golder & Conrad, 2010; Laver & Schofield, 1990; 
Laver, 1998; Riker, 1962), this research has largely overlooked the effect of coalition 
participation on issue salience. Supply-side theories expect radical right parties to 
succeed most when identity issues are salient, and when radical parties are perceived as 
“owning” identity issues. Yet issue salience is typically treated as entirely exogenous to 
the political system (Colomer & Puglisi, 2005; Smith, 2010) or as an outcome of party 
strategies designed to secure a competitive advantage (Belanger & Meguid, 2008; 
Wilkinson, 2004; Wittenberg & Kopstein, 2011).  
My theory endogenizes issue salience, and argues that it is a function of the 
strength and the inclusion of ethno-liberal parties in governing coalitions, which polarize 
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party systems. The salience of identity increases if the ethno-liberal party extracts policy 
concessions from its coalition partner or elevates minority representatives into positions 
of symbolic importance. Policies that privilege and elevate some groups over others 
magnify pre-existing grievances, fuel resentment and create a political backlash that 
benefits radical right parties. The simple formation of a governing coalition between a 
mainstream party and an accommodation-seeking party should therefore increase the 
probability of the radical right’s success in the subsequent electoral cycle.  
The case of Bulgaria illustrates the logic of the backlash against a junior coalition 
partner. Bulgaria did not produce a single radical right party until 2005 when the radical 
right ATAKA party emerged seemingly “out of nowhere” and gained eight percent of the 
vote. At the same time, Bulgaria signed the EU accession treaty and its economy was 
experiencing 7% growth. ATAKA’s success was not surprising when viewed in light of 
the theory. In the 2001 election, the Turkish ethnic party (DPS) was invited into the 
governing coalition and ethnic Turkish ministers became part of the cabinet for the first 
time since 1989. This allowed DPS to block policies aimed at trimming state subsidies 
for tobacco-cultivation, the occupational specialization of many Bulgarian Turks. DPS’s 
growing influence in the Bulgarian political system led to a backlash. The newly founded 
ATAKA professed “ethnic minorities with privileged access to policy-making” to be 
their primary political target and received 21 seats in the parliament. 
The theory generates three important observable empirical implications. The first,  
is that we should observe strong radical right parties after ethno-liberal parties gained 
votes in the prior election. This should follow if radical right parties arise as a backlash 
against the electoral strength of the ethno-liberal parties. The second implication is that 
radical right parties should become stronger after the ethno-liberal party has been 
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included in a governing coalition and obtained a ministerial post, for this permits the 
ethno-liberal parties to influence policies and to access state resources. A third observable 
implication is that radical right parties should succeed in proportion to the ideological 
extremism of the ethno-liberal party in the previous electoral cycle. These implications 
can be expressed as three hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: When the vote share of an ethno-liberal party in an election held at time t-1 
increases, then the radical right party’s vote share in elections at t should also increase. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The inclusion of an ethno-liberal party in a governing coalition at time t-1 
increases the radical right party’s vote share in elections at t. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The inclusion of an ideologically extreme ethno-liberal party in a coalition 
in election t-1 increases the radical right party’s vote share in elections at t. 
 
 
In addition to these dynamic policy influences countries posses different structural 
propensities for the emergence of radical right parties. The theory suggests that the most 
important of these is a country’s ethnic structure. The ethnic structure influences the 
prospects for the radical right party’s success across countries in a counter-intuitive 
manner. In countries with small minorities, the accommodation of minority demands 
results in the minority’s “status elevation.” Radical right voters become irritated with the 
minority’s political successes and aim to curb its further advancement. In countries with 
large minorities, however, change in the accommodation of a politically organized 
minority can significantly threaten the titular nationality with “status reversal” (Petersen, 
2002). Voters vulnerable to status reversal have reason to fear their loss of ethnic 
dominance, and thus rally behind a large mainstream party with broad appeal that is 
deemed capable of containing the threat and unifying the titular nationality. Countries 
with smaller ethnic minorities are therefore actually more likely to have successful 
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radical right parties, since providing seats and portfolios to a smaller minority group 
engenders more resentment among the majority, leading to a backlash that benefits 
radical right parties.  
This prediction seems to contradict expectations from theories that associate larger 
minority groups and larger influxes of immigrants with increased political mobilization 
along ethnic lines (Dancygier, 2010; Golder, 2003; Olzak 1992: 35), but it is in line with 
studies that have found no relationship between the size of immigrant groups and the 
electoral success of radical right parties at the cross-national level (Lucassen and 
Lubbers, 2012; Norris, 2005).  
In sum, the theory focuses on two important factors that help to explain the 
success of failure of radical right parties: (1) the ethnic structure, which determines the 
threat of status elevation, and influences the baseline propensity for the success of radical 
right parties across countries, and (2) minority accommodation and polarization, which 
determines the salience of identity issues and shapes the fortunes of radical right parties 
from one election to the next. 
 
Data Description and Estimation Strategy 
To investigate these hypotheses, I created an election-year-country dataset covering the 
period from the early 1990s to the present for all post-communist democracies.
7
 The data 
set is structured as a quasi-time series of ninety-three parliamentary elections in 
seventeen countries from 1991 to 2012 and the dependent variable is the natural log of 
the radical right party’s combined vote share in elections held at time t.  
To examine the backlash logic embedded in these hypotheses, I utilize three 
measures. The first measure, associated with Hypothesis 1, is the log of the ethno-liberal 
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party’s vote share in the previous electoral cycle. The second measure, to explore 
Hypothesis 2, accounts for the access of the ethno-liberal party to policy making and state 
resources using an indicator of its participation in the governing coalition during the 
previous cycle. Although the ethno-liberal parties must be strong enough to cross the 
electoral threshold in order to be considered for participation in a coalition, it is not the 
case that stronger ethno-liberal parties are more or less likely to be invited to join 
coalitions. For this reason, it is important to measure the strength of the ethno-liberal 
parties in terms of vote shares and their participation in governing coalitions 
independently. I also examine the effect of ethnic structure to test the claim that support 
for radical right parties is stronger in countries with smaller minorities.
8
  
To investigate Hypothesis 3 - that radical right parties arise as a backlash to the 
ideological extremism of the ethno-liberal parties - I rely on the Manifesto project 
(Volkens et al., 2010) for a measure of the proportion of quasi-sentences indicating the 
party positions on identity. In order to measure each party’s ideological position on the 
identity dimension, I turn to the category referred to in the Manifesto Project as the 
“Fabric of Social Life.”9 It is comprised of three categories: national way of life, 
traditional morality and multiculturalism. The overall score is the sum of the positive 
evaluations minus the sum of the negative evaluations of three categories. A low score on 
the index indicating high ideological intensity of the ethno-liberal party, is associated 
with tolerance, social liberalism and accommodation of minorities. A high score indicates 
the opposite. 
To control for the incumbency effect on the radical right party’s success, I include 
the natural log of the radical right party’s vote share in the previous election as a lagged 
dependent variable. The second incumbency measure is an indicator of whether the 
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radical right party was in the governing coalition in the previous electoral cycle. This is 
intended to control for advantageous access to state resources and the gains in credibility 
that the radical right party earned during the previous electoral cycle.  
Finally, since the dataset that I have created is structured as a pooled cross-
national, quasi-time series, it is necessary to account for the fact that elections are nested 
over time within countries. To control for the time effects due to the fact that vote shares 
are measured in consecutive elections, I control for the years since the first, foundational 
election. I estimate a set of censored models with random effects to account for the 
hierarchical data structure. 
 
A Statistical Model 
Electoral success is measured as the vote share of the radical right party in a given 
country-election-year.
10
 To provide a sense of the distribution, the mean vote share for 
the radical right parties in ninety-three elections is 6.5% for the whole distribution and 
7.7% for the non-censored part. The range is between 0.07% and 50% percent. In thirteen 
elections, the vote share of the radical right party was below one percent, and in fourteen 
elections no radical right party contested the elections at all.  
I include all elections in the statistical analysis regardless of the absence or 
presence of the radical right parties on the ballot. This is done to avoid any potential bias 
from disregarding the “censored cases,” defined as elections in which the radical right 
parties do not field any candidates. To include elections with zero vote shares, I use a 
latent variable model for censored outcomes (Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Golder, 2003; 
Swank & Betz, 2003). The random effects model in non-linear panel data is widely 
preferred over the fixed effects model due to the inconsistency and bias of the maximum 
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likelihood estimator.11 I modify the model outlined in Greene (2008) and Henningsen 
(2011) and limit the censoring structure to left side.
 
This left censored regression model 
for panel data with country specific effects can be written as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 
∗ =  𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑇 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  =  𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑇 𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖  +  𝜈𝑖𝑡 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎           if 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝑎, 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗           if 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ > 𝑎 
The subscripts 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 cover the countries, while subscripts 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇𝑖 
indicate the time period, starting with 1 as the post-foundational election.  𝑇𝑖 is the 
number of years observed for the 𝑖th country; 𝜇𝑖 is a time-invariant country specific 
effect; and 𝜈𝑖𝑡 is the remaining disturbance. Assuming that the country specific effects 𝜇𝑖 
are independent of the covariates, we can estimate the parameters with a random effects 
model. Assuming further that specific country effects 𝜇 follow a normal distribution with 
mean 0 and variance 𝜎𝜐
2, and 𝜇 and 𝜐 are independent, the likelihood contribution of a 
single country 𝑖 is given as follows: 
ℒ𝑖 =  ∫ {∏ [Φ (
𝑎 − 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 − 𝜇𝑖
𝜎𝜐
)]
𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑎𝑇𝑖
𝑡=1
 [
1
𝜎𝜈
𝜙 (
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 − 𝜇𝑖
𝜎𝜐
)]
(1−𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑎)
}
∞
−∞
 𝜙 (
𝜇𝑖
𝜎𝜇
) 𝑑𝜇𝑖 
where ϕ(. ) and Φ(. ) denote the probability density function and the cumulative 
distributive function, respectively, of the standard normal distribution, and Ι𝑖 
𝑎 is the 
indicator function with:   
Ι𝑖𝑡 
𝑎 = 0           if 𝑦𝑖𝑡 > 𝑎 
Ι𝑖𝑡 
𝑎 = 1           if 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 
An important assumption of the censored model is that the underlying process that 
causes the party to be absent from an election is identical to the process that explains the 
electoral support of parties that in fact entered the race. In addition to the fourteen 
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elections in which no party was present on the ballot, there were twenty-six contested 
elections in which radical right parties received less than 2.5 percent of the vote, and 
thirty-nine contested elections in which parties received less than 5 percent of the vote.  
Given that many countries impose a five percent electoral threshold, this large 
number of elections where radical right parties could not have been expected to win a 
seat in the legislature leads me to believe that it is not necessary to model the selection 
process in which no parties appear on the ballot separately. The theory should be able to 
both explain cases in which parties do not contest the election as well as cases in which 
parties receive a negligible number of votes.  
 
 
Empirical Results 
I first look descriptively at the electoral success of radical right parties. Using the total 
number of elections as the baseline, radical right parties succeeded (i.e. were able to win 
at least one seat) in 43 out of 93 elections. Of these 43 electoral successes, 37 were 
preceded by a “coalition with one of the bilateral opposites” (Table 2). The contrapositive 
is also informative in 37 out of 43 elections without a radical right party success at time t 
were not preceded by a “coalition with one of the bilateral opposites” at t-1. 
- TABLE 2 HERE - 
Table 3 further disaggregates coalitions into two groups - coalitions with ethno-
liberal parties and coalitions with radical right parties - and shows that the results are 
robust. Using the total number of elections with “coalitions with one of the bilateral 
opposites” as the baseline, 37 of 50 elections with “coalitions with one of the bilateral 
opposites” in time t resulted in the electoral success of the radical right party in the 
subsequent election. In 22 out of 33 elections, the electoral success of the radical right 
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party was preceded by a governing coalition in which the ethno-liberal party obtained a 
portfolio. Radical right parties succeeded in two thirds of elections when the ethno-liberal 
party controlled a governmental portfolio in the previous electoral cycle. 
- TABLE 3 HERE - 
These descriptive statistics suggest a strong relationship between the government 
participation of an ethno-liberal party and the success of a radical right party and point to 
the plausibility of the backlash mechanism. The results also uncover a strong incumbency 
effect, showing that a radical right party held a portfolio in a government that preceded 
the electoral radical right’s success in 15 out of 17 elections. 
The case of Slovakia suggests the importance of holding a government portfolio 
for radical right mobilization. In 2002, the Hungarian ethnic party (MKP) was invited to 
join the governing coalition and used its power to promote minority schooling, including 
a new Hungarian speaking Selye János University. MKP was also granted the portfolio 
for regional development and used it ruthlessly to channel resources to Hungarian 
districts. This re-mobilized the Slovak National Party (SNS), which was rife with internal 
discord and had been in decline. In the 2006 election, SNS reunited and secured almost 
twelve percent of the vote and a partnership in the governing coalition. This granted SNS 
the portfolio of the Ministry of Regional Development and the ability to briskly shift 
resources away from Hungarian districts and towards predominantly Slovak districts.
12
  
Turning to the multivariable statistical results, the electoral success of the ethno-
liberal party in the previous electoral cycle increases the prospects for the radical right 
party in the subsequent electoral cycle, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1 (Table 4). 
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, presence of an ethno-liberal party in a governing coalition 
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also increases the electoral prospects of the radical right party in the next electoral cycle. 
Empirical evidence for Hypothesis 3 is discussed later in the text. 
The results, based on the relationship between the size of the titular majority and 
party support, indicate that the size of the minority is negatively related to the electoral 
prospect of the radical right parties, and that countries with smaller ethnic minorities are 
more likely to have more successful radical right parties.
13
 Finally, I find evidence of a 
strong incumbency effect for radical right parties. The electoral strength of the radical 
right party in the previous cycle, and to a lesser extent its presence in the previous 
government, predicts the radical right party’s electoral success in the subsequent electoral 
cycle.   
To explore the marginal effects of the variables, I constructed a “violin plot” 
(Hintze & Nelson, 1998). It combines the advantages of a boxplot, which indicate the 
average effect and the uncertainty, with a kernel density plot that more effectively shows 
the distribution of the variable’s effect. Specifically, I constructed a box plot of the 
marginal effect under two high probability scenarios and then added a rotated kernel 
density plot to each side of the box plot. The marginal effects are drawn from post-
estimations using as the basis the censored regression Model 2 in Table 4.
14 
- TABLE 4 HERE - 
 Figure 1 illustrates the marginal effect of two key variables. The top panel 
compares the expected vote share for the radical right at time t when an ethno-liberal 
party was included in a coalition at time t-1 (top right) vs. when the radical right was not 
included in a governing coalition (top left). The effect of being in a coalition increased 
the expected vote share for the radical right by a factor of roughly two, or double the 
share of votes. The bottom panel compares the expected vote share for the radical right at 
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time t (bottom left) when an ethno-liberal party received relatively few votes (25
th
 
percentile) at time t-1 vs. when an ethno-liberal party received a significant share of votes 
(75
th
 percentile, bottom right). On average, the effect size is comparable to the coalition 
effect size. It roughly doubles the vote share for the radical right. 
- FIGURE 1 HERE - 
Spies and Franzmann (2011) show that party system polarization on cultural 
issues and the lack of polarization on economic issues jointly increase extremist voting. 
Whereas the presence of ethno-liberal parties polarizes the electorate and increases the 
salience on identity issues, parties can project positions on economic issues that are 
salient while also being centrist. Agreement among the major parties on the direction of 
market reforms signifies policy convergence (Frye 2002). At the same time, rapid 
economic policy changes will tend to increase the salience of economic issues. The 
analysis consistently shows that economic grievances, such as unemployment, are 
statistically unrelated to support for radical right parties (Table 4).
15
  
To further explore the link between economic salience and support for radical 
right parties, I created a new measure of “Economic Volatility”. It is based on the 
composite of six EBRD transition scores (EBRD 2013). A high score can be achieved 
either by swift reform developments or swift retraction from liberalization policies, 
relative to changes in previous years. The variable captures the average relative change in 
economic transition scores for each electoral cycle. The results in Model 3 to Model 6 
(Table 4) show that high economic volatility increases support for radical right voting, 
controlling for unemployment and wealth. This suggests that indicators of volatility and 
policy uncertainty, often unrelated to objective grievances, are potentially stronger 
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predictors of radical right voting than measures of economic deprivation and 
development  (c.f. Arzheimer, 2009; Tucker, 2005). 
Since not all post-communist democracies are members of the European Union 
(EU), and radical right parties are known for their Eurosceptic views, I inspected the 
effect of EU membership on party strength. While the EU membership itself is unrelated 
to radical right support, it mediates the effect of economic volatility on radical right 
voting (Model 5 in Table 4). The interaction effect indicates that the membership in the 
EU tempered the effect of economic volatility, which suggests that the promise of EU 
membership has had a calming effect on the accession countries (Kelley, 2004; 
Vachudova, 2008). By decreasing anxiety over the economic transition, entry into the EU 
slightly decreased support for the radical right. 
To control for distinct features of the electoral system across countries, I use 
Gallagher’s index of disproportionality, Rae’s index of party system fractionalization and 
Laakso-Taagepera measure of the effective number of parties. I found a modest effect for 
the effective number of electoral parties (Table 5) and disproportionality in the electoral 
system on radical right support (Model 7 in Table 4).  Consistent with a controversial 
finding by Arzheimer and Carter (2006), support for radical right parties mildly increases 
as the disproportionality increases (c.f. Givens 2005). The results from the censored 
regression model are unaffected by voter turnout, by urban-rural cleavage (Pop-Eleches, 
2010; Tavits, 2005), by special rules that secure seats in parliament for ethnic minorities 
and by lower thresholds allowing ethnic parties to succeed in elections (Bernauer & 
Boschler, 2009). Cross-national differences in other factors—including economic 
grievances, fragmentation, political accountability, legacy of inter-war radicalism are also 
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unable to explain why radical parties are stronger in some countries and at some times, 
but weaker in others. 
To ensure the model properly accommodates the censored nature of the 
underlying data, I used Cragg’s test to address the “corner solution model” specification 
(Green, 2008).
16
 I also ran the mirror image of the model, predicting vote share for ethno-
liberal parties by vote share and coalition presence of radical right parties in the previous 
electoral cycle, and found no effect of radical right vote share on support for ethno-liberal 
parties. I also tested for the robustness of ethno-liberal party coding by first excluding 
social liberal parties from the analysis and by recoding social liberal parties as 
mainstream parties. The results were robust to all of these modifications. 
-TABLE 5 HERE – 
 
I performed additional robustness checks by examining the effect of electoral 
system characteristics (Gallagher 2013) on support for radical right parties (Table 5). The 
results are remarkably robust to the inclusion of three indicators: (1) the electoral 
threshold, (2) the effective number of parties at the parliamentary level (seats) and (3) the 
effective number of parties at the electoral level (votes). The effective number of 
electoral parties (Model 5 and Model 6 in Table 5) shows a modestly significant and 
positive effect, which suggests that more diverse political systems produce stronger 
radical right parties. The electoral threshold and the effective number of parliamentary 
parties do not exhibit statistically significant effects (Table 5).  
- TABLE 6 HERE - 
I found a conditional support for Hypothesis 3, which predicted a positive 
relationship between the ideological intensity of the ethno-liberal party in the previous 
election and the success of the radical right parties (Table 6).
17
 There is no relationship 
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between the absolute ideological intensity of the ethno-liberal party in the previous 
election and future votes for a radical right party (Model 1 in Table 6).
18
 It might be 
argued that this is hardly surprising, since the ideological intensity of the ethno-liberal 
party itself does not generate votes for the radical right party in the subsequent election 
without access to policy making and political power. Consistent with this interpretation, 
Hypothesis 3 is supported when the ideological intensity of the ethno-liberal party is 
considered jointly with the presence of the ethno-liberal party in the government.
 
 
The interaction of the ethno-liberal party coalition presence and its absolute 
ideological intensity is statistically significant in Model 2 (Table 6). The more 
accommodation sought by the ethno-liberal party that served in the governing coalition, 
the greater the electoral success of the radical right party in the following election. The 
effect of the ethno-liberal party’s ideological intensity must be considered relative to the 
ideological intensity of the moderate proximate party. This is tested in Model 4, which 
includes an interaction between the presence of the ethno-liberal party in a governing 
coalition and its relative ideological intensity, defined as the ideological distance between 
the ethno-liberal party and its proximate moderate party competitor. Although the relative 
ideological intensity of the ethno-liberal party does not have an independent effect on the 
vote shares of the radical right party, its interaction with coalition presence points in the 
expected direction.  
When an ethno-liberal party that seeks high levels of accommodation is included 
in a coalition, the radical right succeeded in the ensuing election.
19
 Table 6 shows that the 
absolute and relative ideological intensity of the ethno-liberal parties matters only if the 
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ethno-liberal parties obtain a platform to express their views and realize their preferences 
in coalition governments. 
I found no evidence that the positions of the mainstream parties themselves have 
any discernible effect on the radical right party success. I also found no effect of 
ideological convergence of mainstream parties and no effect of the ideological distance 
between the mainstream right and radical right on radical right party success.
20
 None of 
these robustness checks altered the core finding that the ethno-liberal party’s coalition 
presence and its electoral success increase the vote shares for the radical right party in the 
following election. These results strongly suggest that the electoral success of radical 
right parties depends on polarization driven by non-proximate parties.  
Focusing on the political effect of bilateral opposite parties helps to address an 
important policy issue - how should mainstream parties address the challenge of radical 
right parties? Scholars fundamentally disagree about whether the most effective strategy 
to keep radical parties at bay is to radicalize or to moderate. Some have suggested that 
support for a radical right party decreases when the proximate mainstream party 
radicalizes on identity issues, steals the extremist issue, and “squeezes out” the radical 
right. Others submit that when a proximate mainstream party radicalizes, it facilitates the 
rise of radical parties, since the mainstream party legitimizes the extremist agenda and 
facilitates outbidding on the extreme pole of the political spectrum (Adams & Somer-
Topcu, 2009; Art, 2011; Bale, 2003; Cappocia, 2001; Downs, 2001; Ignazi, 1992; Jenne, 
2007; Kelley, 2004; Mudde, 2007). 
Although it is perhaps tempting to look for explanations of radical right party 
success in their immediate ideological neighborhood, these results indicate that such an 
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approach may be misleading, for it risks attributing to the mainstream parties what should 
actually be imputed to the bilateral opposite parties. There is evidence to support the 
claim that both strategies can effectively shut radical right parties out of politics but may 
also make them martyrs of nationalist causes.  
The theory and the analysis suggest that we should turn our attention towards the 
study of non-proximate parties (Meguid, 2005; Sartori, 1976). Ethno-liberal parties are 
natural and credible representatives for highly accommodative policies toward ethnic and 
social minorities. When moderate parties bring them on board, the political pendulum 
swings in their direction, but the unintended consequence is an obvious political backlash 
against accommodation. Radical right parties are credible agents to carry forward this 
reactionary agenda and benefit electorally from the success of their ideological twin. The 
dynamic of political backlash against the accommodation of ethno-liberal parties is a real 
political force, and provides significant explanatory purchase on explaining the rise and 
fall of the radical right across highly varied contexts.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper presents a new theory of radical right politics, and derives testable 
implications of the theory using new data set that covers elections in all post-communist 
democracies over the past twenty years. The results indicate strong support for the first 
two hypotheses and qualified support for the third one. The analysis shows that the 
electoral prospects of radical right parties improve with the electoral strength of their 
bilateral opposites, namely the ethno-liberal parties. They also gain substantial strength 
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when the ethno-liberal party serves in the government and when the ethno-liberal party is 
ideologically extreme.  
Although the literature has largely focused upon the role of mainstream and 
proximate parties, this study shows that the radical right’s ideological bilateral opposite - 
ethno-liberal parties - plays a crucial role. To a large extent, then, the rise and fall of 
radical right parties is a reactive political phenomenon, an electoral response to the 
political fortunes of their ideological twins. Parties advocating minority accommodation 
polarize party systems and empower radical right party appeals. 
In some ways, this argument represents a return to an earlier literature on the 
origins of radical right parties in Western Europe. Some of the first studies recognized 
that the sudden rise in radical right-wing politics in the 1980s was initially a form of a 
backlash against the new political forces representing voters with post-material, socially 
liberal values and green parties (Ignazi, 1992; Kitschelt & McGann, 1995; von Beyme, 
1988). These early insights have been largely lost in the ensuing debate, which focused 
upon the profile of radical right voters, the institutional and structural determinants of 
radical right support and on the dynamics of competition between the mainstream parties.  
Can the argument advanced here travel beyond Eastern Europe? Only further 
analysis will show for sure, but the answer may lie in re-assessing a well-established 
consociational theory (Lijphart, 1984). The political impact of power-sharing institutions 
might be mitigated by the size of the quarrelling groups. Netherlands initially avoided a 
large-scale conflict between its large pillars due to the accommodation. Yet built in 
mechanisms to placate minorities might have fueled radical right parties in countries such 
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as Austria, Bosnia, Lebanon and Switzerland, where discontent has been generated by 
disproportionate accommodation afforded to small minorities. 
In Eastern Europe, parties quibble over language policies. Elsewhere, politicians 
argue over head-coverings and housing subsidies for ethnic minorities. The vehicles of 
accommodation differ with contexts. Yet the argument that accommodation of minorities 
polarizes the electorate, increases the salience of non-economic issues and can create a 
political backlash may be unfortunately universal.  
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Table 1: Combined vote shares for Radical Right Parties since the founding elections 
 
 Elections 
  1
st
 2
nd
 3
rd
 4
th
 5
th
 6th 7
th
 
Albania 4.97 2.30 2.40 0.60 0.34   
Bulgaria 1.13 0.54 0.18 0.07 8.14 9.36  
Croatia 50.00 47.51 31.85 6.37 3.50 3.00  
Czech Rep 5.98 8.01 3.09 1.08 0.17 1.14  
Estonia 11.50 16.10 8.40 1.70 0.40   
Hungary 1.59 5.47 4.37 2.20 16.67   
Latvia 11.99 14.37 5.39 6.94 7.67   
Lithuania 4.01 2.77 0.28 1.75 0.63   
Macedonia 0.00 0.00 6.10 0.24 2.51   
Moldova 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Montenegro 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
Poland 2.85 5.63 7.87 8.00 1.30 0.07  
Romania 8.82 19.48 15.12 5.42 13.98   
Serbia Montenegro, FRY 8.60 35.27 28.59 29.46 4.63   
Slovakia 7.93 5.40 9.07 6.98 11.73 5.07 4.55 
Slovenia 3.22 4.39 6.27 5.40 1.80   
Ukraine 1.25 1.00 0.00 0.36 0.76 10.45  
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Table 2: The Electoral Success of radical right parties in t by a “coalition with one of 
the bilateral (B-L) opposites” in t-1 
 
  
Coalition with B-L 
opposite 
in t-1 
No coalition with B-L 
opposite 
in t-1 Totals 
Electoral success of RR in t 37 6 43 
Electoral failure of RR in t 13 37 50 
  50 43 93 
 
Electoral success of radical right party in t,  (number of parliamentary seats >1) 
Electoral failure of the radical right party in t, (no parliamentary seats gained in t) 
Presence of a “coalition with one of the bilateral opposites” in previous elections (t-1) 
No “coalition with one of the bilateral opposites” in the previous electoral cycle (t-1) 
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Table 3:  The Electoral Success of radical right parties in t by coalition type in t-1 
 
  
Ethno-liberal party 
 in a coalition 
in t-1 
Radical right party 
in a coalition 
in t-1 Totals 
Electoral success of RR in t 22 15 37 
Electoral failure of RR in t 11 2 13 
  
 33 17 50 
 
Electoral success of radical right party in t, (number of parliamentary seats >1) 
Electoral failure (no parliamentary seats for radical right party in t) 
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Table 4: Determinants of the electoral support for the radical right parties 
Censored regression with random effects, DV: log of total vote shares for the radical right parties 
      
    (M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) (M5) (M6) (M7) (M8)    
 
Ethno-liberal party in coalition (t-1) .522** .504** .520*** .553*** .499** .418** .519*** .472**  
(1=participated)   (.204) (.204) (.197) (.195) (.206) (.209) (.201) (.200)    
 
Ethno-liberal party vote share (t-1) .249*** .230*** .246*** .263*** .268*** .191** .221*** .223*** 
   (.087) (.082) (.084) (.090) (.087) (.083) (.078) (.077)    
 
Radical right party in coalition (t-1) .665** .796*** .567** .616** .729*** .483* .535** .513*   
(1=participated)   (.273) (.266) (.265) (.261) (.256) (.282) (.269) (.273)    
 
Radical right party vote share (t-1) .603*** .569*** .634*** .606*** .597*** .691*** .730*** .714*** 
   (.125) (.108) (.120) (.129) (.109) (.098) (.092) (.095)    
 
Size of the titular majority   1.274**   1.180**   .598    
    (.527)   (.510)   (.541)    
 
Economic Volatility (elect. cycle)    .0579** .147*** .148** .0672**  .0474*   
     (.026) (.053) (.060) (.029)  (.027)    
 
EU membership (1=member)     .247 .122                   
      (.248) (.215)                   
 
Interaction: EU * Econ. Volatility      -.116* -.114*                   
      (.060) (.060)                   
 
Years since the 1st election      .00435                   
       (.017)                   
 
Wealth – GDP/PC (t-1)       .0862                  
        (.176)                  
 
Unemployment (t-1)        -.008                  
        (.010)                  
 
Disproportionality         .026* .014   
          (.016) (.017)    
 
Constant    -.202 -5.741** -.341* -.531** -5.689** -.985 -.475* -3.092    
   (.192) (2.312) (.197) (.235) (2.232) (1.575) (.244) (2.323)     
       
                        
Sigma (u)    .234 .129 .211 .259 .138 2.72e-16 2.02e-16 2.19e-17    
    (.177) (.217) (.176) (.171) (.204) (.182) (.176) (.152)    
            
                    
Sigma (e)    .662*** .664*** .645*** .622*** .630*** .667*** .644*** .631*** 
   (.061) (.061) (.060) (.058) (.059) (.058) (.057) (.056)    
         
Number of elections   93 93 93 93 93 80 76 76    
Number of countries   17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17  
Log Likelihood   -91.93 -88.61 -89.54 -87.75 -84.84 -76.52 -71.04 -68.88    
Chi2    107.5 143.5 118.7 114.7 157.5 157.2 163.1 168.7    
AIC    197.9 193.2 195.1 195.5 193.7 173.0 158.1 157.8    
Censored Observations  14 14 14 14 14 12 11 11 
Uncensored Observations  79 79 79 79 79 68 65 65 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01 
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Table 5: Determinants of the electoral support for the radical right parties 
Censored regression with random effects, DV: log of total vote shares for the radical right parties 
Robustness Checks for the Effect of Electoral Systems 
 
      
    (M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) (M5) (M6) (M7)   
 
Ethno-liberal party in coalition (t-1) .463** .478** .520** .495** .573*** .581*** .484**  
(1=participated)   (.189) (.187) (.203) (.205) (.177) (.178) (.203)   
 
Ethno-liberal party vote share (t-1) .222*** .223*** .167** .183** .231*** .228*** .227***   
   (.078) (.078) (.079) (.081) (.074) (.074) (.079)     
 
Radical right party in coalition (t-1) .594** .778*** .551** .614** .534** .659*** .597**   
(1=participated)   (.256) (.261) (.255) (.267) (.232) (.242) (.273)   
 
Radical right party vote share (t-1) .672*** .589*** .574*** .564*** .667*** .623*** .691***   
(.087) (.091) (.093) (.094) (.082) (.086) (.096)   
 
Electoral threshold   -.086 -.015     .079 
   (.099) (.101)     (.104) 
 
Size of the titular majority    1.206**  .513  .746* .693  
    (.489)  (.637)  (.450) (.558)   
 
Effective number of parties     .027 .037     
(seats)       (.033) (.035)     
 
Effective number of parties      .078* .084*    
(votes)        (.043) (.043)      
 
Disproportionality         .023     
         (.017)      
 
Constant     .177 -5.374** -.0283 -2.357 -.700*** -3.968** -3.815   
   (.477) (2.301) (.240) (2.906) (.257) (2.005) (2.540)   
 
Sigma (u)    .213 .126 1.90e-17 3.34e-17 .179 .171 1.90e-16  
   (.190) (.224) (.121) (.120) (.147) (.148) (.166)  
 
Sigma (e)    .688*** .674*** .616*** .615*** .602*** .599*** .640***  
   (.056) (.054) (.056) (.056) (.052) (.051) (.057)  
 
Number of elections   93 93 68 68 83 83 76     
Number of countries   17 17 15 15 17 17 17  
Log Likelihood   -91.91 -88.65 -63.21 -62.89 -71.78 -70.33 -70.10   
Chi2    163.4 166.6 116.5 116.7 181.9 178.9 162.6   
AIC    197.8 193.3 142.4 143.8 157.6 156.7 160.2    
Censored Observations  14 14 6 6 13 13 11  
Uncensored Observations  79 79 62 62 70 70 65   
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01 
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Table 6: Determinants of the electoral support for the radical right parties 
Panel regression with random effects, DV: log of total vote shares for the radical right parties 
 
 
    (M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) (M5) (M6) 
       
Ethno-liberal party in coalition (t-1) .740*** .599*** .628*** .432* .558** .406*   
(1=participated)   (.224) (.222) (.211) (.224) (.235) (.234)    
 
Ethno-liberal party vote share (t-1) .172 .219* .203* .243** .228* .248**  
    (.122) (.115) (.111) (.108) (.117) (.110)    
 
Radical right party in coalition (t-1) .500 .485 .434 .449 .454 .433    
(1=participated)   (.373) (.310) (.315) (.301) (.317) (.307)    
 
Radical right party vote share (t-1) .666*** .733*** .741*** .772*** .737*** .774*** 
    (.132) (.128) (.124) (.120) (.129) (.121)    
 
Years since the 1st election  -.025 -.034 -.035* -.050** -.024 -.043    
    (.023) (.022) (.021) (.021) (.027) (.027)    
 
Size of the titular majority  -.294                     
    (.805)                     
 
Ethno-liberal party ideology, abs (t-1) -.025 -.002   .004                 
     (.026) (.026)   (.028)                 
 
Interaction: Ethno-liberal p. in coal. *  -.103*   -.105*                 
Ethno-liberal party ideology, absolute  (.054)   (.055)                 
 
Ethno-liberal party ideology, rel. (t-1)   .021 -.008  -.011    
(Distance from proximate competitor)   (.025) (.028)  (.029)    
 
Interaction: Ethno-liberal p. in coal. *    .107**  .107**  
Ethno-liberal party ideology, relative    (.053)  (.054)    
 
Economic Volatility (elect. cycle)     .064 .044    
       (.107) (.099)    
 
Constant    1.293 -.054 -.074 .060 -.246 -.076    
    (3.635) (.424) (.414) (.401) (.536) (.508)    
       
Sigma (e)    .66 .66 .60 .57 .67 .59 
Number of elections   39 39 38 38 39 38    
Number of countries   13 13 13 13              13   13 
Chi2    65.68 76.55 81.08 93.01 75.32 90.72    
R^2       .68 .71 .72 .76 .72     . 76   
       
Standard errors in parentheses; * p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01 
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Figure 1: Violin plots with marginal effects based on censored regression (Table 4, Model 2)  
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Notes: 
                                                     
1
 I use the term radical, rather than extremist, to connote a party that does not challenge 
the democratic order of a given country (Carter, 2005). 
2
 While radical right parties in Western Europe often target immigrants, this is less the 
case in Eastern Europe. 
3
 This paper explores peacetime electoral dynamics, and does not seek to explain politics 
at the time of the collapse of the communist regimes (Bunce 1999). 
4
 Eastern European radical right parties support redistribution (Bustikova & Kitschelt, 
2009), whereas Western European radical right parties span the spectrum from the 
economic right to the left (Mudde, 2007). Grid/group framework is helpful in deciding 
whether some of the former unreformed communist parties qualify as radical right parties 
(Ishyiama, 2009).  
5
 Social-liberal parties are rare. They support multiculturalism as well as social and 
economic inclusion of Roma.  
6
 The complete list of parties, an explanation of the classification procedures and 
additional material can be found in the on-line appendix: <bustikova.faculty.asu.edu>. 
7
 This excludes the first or initial elections and elections that were boycotted.  
8
 The size of the titular majority and the size of the minority are unrelated to vote shares 
for ethnic parties. Countries with larger minorities do not have stronger ethnic parties. 
Moreover, vote shares for ethnic parties fluctuate over time even though group size is 
relatively constant over time. 
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9
 The absolute ideological extremism of the ethno-liberal party is measured on the basis 
of the manifesto data and the score is based on positions expressed in the manifesto of the 
ethno-liberal party. The ideological extremism of the ethno-liberal party is indexed 
against its proximate competitor, a moderate, mainstream party that also supports the 
accommodation of minorities. The greater the distance between the two parties, the 
greater the relative ideological extremism of accommodation advocated by the ethno-
liberal party.  
10
 In the rare case that there are two radical right parties in one electoral system, it is 
measured as a cumulative vote share of all radical right parties. 
11
 The maximum likelihood estimator in censored regression with fixed effects is widely 
understood to be biased and inconsistent when T, the length of the panel, is small and 
fixed. Since the random effect model is superior, there is no need to perform a Hausman 
test for fixed versus random effects. 
12
 Source: Transparency International Slovakia, author’s interviews in Slovakia, 2007, 
2008. 
13
 Minority size is based on the census in each country. While perceived group size may 
differ in some cases from actual group size, unfortunately the lack of data for the time 
period and countries analyzed here does not allow for testing this hypothesis. 
14
 To examine the model’s predictive performance on out-of-sample data, I used a cross-
validation experiment to compare the Heckman and the censored approach, and found 
that the censored approach consistently performed better (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993). 
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15
 I have tested for the interaction effect between the coalition presence of the ethno-
liberal party and its vote share in the previous cycle and found the interaction 
insignificant. Myriad factors, including wealth, changes in wealth, changes in wealth 
indexed to 1990 levels of development, inflation, government expenditures, growth in 
government expenditures, welfare state development proxies, and both levels and 
changes in levels of these variables, all have no independent effect on the electoral 
strength of the radical right parties. 
16
 I tested for the assumption that the censoring limit depends on the same distribution as 
the uncensored observations, which in our case is any vote share, even very small, for any 
radical right party that contested the election. I tested Cragg’s corner solution model by 
using a two equation system where the first equation estimates the probability of being 
above the censoring limit (the minimal number of vote shares) and the second is a 
truncated regression on the uncensored observation, all vote shares observed. The 
likelihood ratio test statistic was 15.6, which is an equivalent of the 0.05 critical value of 
chi-square with eight degrees of freedom. This led me not to reject the null hypothesis 
that the restricted model (e.g. censored regression) is true. 
17
 I assume that higher portions of the party Manifestos (coded as quasi-sentences) that 
advocate multiculturalism and tolerance for minority views indicate more ideological 
intensity. There are a number of missing codings in the Manifesto project, especially with 
regard to the evaluations of small ethno-liberal and small radical right parties, which 
reduces the sample size. Since missing manifestos are conflated with no radical right 
parties contested elections, I decided against the implementation of the censored model.  
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18
 The same result is obtained for the relative ideological intensity of the ethno-liberal 
party. 
19
 While most of the variables in Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6 are consistent across the 
models, the incumbency effect of the radical right parties inclusion in the government is 
not confirmed by an analysis of the manifesto data. This might be due to the lower 
number of cases included in the analysis and multiple omissions of small parties due to 
missing data. 
20
 I also did not uncover any effect of the radical right party’s ideological intensity. The 
robustness checks included testing for: Ideological convergence of moderate parties 
(level and change); Absolute ideological extremism of the RR party (level and change); 
Relative ideological extremism of the RR party (level and change); Ideological 
extremism of the ethno-liberal party’s proximate competitor; Ideological extremism of 
RR’s proximate competitor party. 
